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Abstract: Much has been written about the complicated inter-
textual relationships between J. M. Coetzee’s novels and previous 
works by writers such as Franz Kafka, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Samuel 
Beckett, and, especially, Daniel Defoe. Relatively little has been 
written, in comparison, about any relationship between Coetzee 
and Defoe’s great contemporary, Jonathan Swift. We claim no ex-
tensive structural relationship between Coetzee’s novels and Swift’s 
works—nothing like the formal interlace between Robinson Crusoe 
and Foe, for example. We do claim, however, a strong and ex-
plicitly signalled likeness of narrative stance, marked especially by 
the ironic distance between author and protagonist in Gulliver’s 
Travels and Elizabeth Costello. We rehearse the extensive evidence 
of Coetzee’s attention to Swift (both in novels and criticism) and 
suggest that there is a Swiftian dimension to Coetzee’s oeuvre that 
is evident in several books, including Dusklands, Youth, Elizabeth 
Costello, and Diary of a Bad Year.
Keywords: Jonathan Swift, J. M. Coetzee, narrative voice, 
Gulliver’s Travels, Elizabeth Costello

I. Coetzee and Swift
Linda Colley’s Captives opens with two parables of British Empire 
from eighteenth-century literature that are relevant to J. M. Coetzee’s 
post colonial vision. In the first, “a man sets out on an eventful trad-
ing voyage, and is ultimately shipwrecked. He finds himself the lone 
survivor on a desert island, but despair soon gives way to resolu-
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tion, Protestant faith, and busy ingenuity” (1). This is Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe (1719), and Coetzee has explicitly worried at that 
novel and its mythic baggage throughout his career, most obviously 
in Foe (1986). We contend that Coetzee’s work also contains a more 
submerged but nonetheless extensive engagement with Colley’s second 
parable, in which a man
sets sail from Bristol, centre of transatlantic commerce and 
slaving, bound for successive zones of European imperialism: 
Spanish America, the West Indies, coastal India. He never 
reaches them. Instead, his voyages are aborted, time and again, 
by events and beings beyond his control.  .  .  . For this man, 
overseas venturing brings no conquests, or riches, or easy com-
placencies: only terror, vulnerability, and repeated captivities, 
and in the process an alteration of self and a telling of stories. 
(Colley 1–2)
This disenchanted parable of colonial endeavour is Jonathan Swift’s 
Gulliver’s Travels (1726), and it provides Colley with an initial frame 
for an account of British captivity narratives between 1600–1850. For 
us it is a window into the condition of narrators and protagonists in 
Coetzee’s texts who encounter the dark works of colonialism, particu-
larly Elizabeth Costello. 
Many critics have noted links between Coetzee and Defoe, as well as 
between Coetzee and authors such as Franz Kafka, Fyodor Dostoevsky, 
and Samuel Beckett.1 On many occasions, Coetzee’s works exist within 
their myths and forms, often explicitly in a critical manner. Foe is a 
postcolonial rewriting of Robinson Crusoe; Life & Times of Michael K 
(1984) contains many implicit references to Kafka’s work (even though 
Coetzee protested to an interviewer that he does not “believe that Kafka 
has an exclusive right to the letter K” [Morphet 457]); and The Master 
of Petersburg (1994) uses Dostoevsky as its main character. Swift’s influ-
ence is less easily tracked through plots or characters and fewer crit-
ics have discussed it: a search of the MLA Bibliography yields only one 
article, by Richard A. Barney, and a chapter by Jonathan Lamb titled 
“Gulliver and the Lives of Animals.” Both deal with links between Swift 
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and the theme of animals in Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello books. This 
essay gauges the “Swiftian” nature of the voices and thematic preoc-
cupations of Elizabeth Costello (2003). We do not allege that the kind 
of connection Coetzee explicitly makes with Defoe, Kafka, Dostoevsky, 
and Beckett is made with Swift in Elizabeth Costello. We instead suggest 
that the novel calls up some common thematic interests with Gulliver’s 
Travels and, more importantly, deploys strong similarities of voice that 
are very likely deliberate. 
Coetzee’s engagement with Swift is signalled early in Youth (2002), 
which, despite its unstable relationship between author and character, 
remains the best guide we have to the young John Coetzee’s intellectual 
development: “He has begun to prefer Pope to Shakespeare, and Swift 
to Pope. Despite the cruel precision of his phrasing, of which he ap-
proves, Pope strikes him as still too much at home among petticoats 
and periwigs, whereas Swift remains a wild man, a solitary” (Coetzee 
21). It seems possible that Coetzee might have found a conscious 
model in Swift’s ruthless irony and alienation. We start by gathering 
empirical evidence, which, though not overwhelming, is plausible. As a 
critic, Coetzee studied Swift’s rhetoric in several essays, including “The 
Rhetoric of the Passive in English” (1980), which discusses “A Modest 
Proposal” and “An Argument against Abolishing Christianity,” and 
“The Agentless Sentence as Rhetorical Device” (1980), which compares 
Swift’s irony in “An Argument against Abolishing Christianity” with 
Edward Gibbon’s attack on “the intolerance and superstitiousness of 
early Christianity” in Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (Coetzee, 
“Agentless” 177). Coetzee finds that “Swift’s vertiginously ironic argu-
ment is deployed behind a mask” (175), with the effect that “the text is 
not finally ambiguous, though it is cryptic and an inexperienced reader 
may quite possibly misread it” (177). In “The Manuscript Revisions 
of Beckett’s Watt” (1972), he notes that “the formal and narrative in-
decisiveness of its ending” has “echoes of Swift’s A Tale of a Tub” (39). 
As a visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Buffalo in the late 
1960s, he included Gulliver’s Travels on the reading list for his “Great 
Writers” course. He set his students the following assignment on 
Robinson Crusoe: 
Gi l l i an  Doo l e y  &  Robe r t  Ph idd i an
4
Write a five-page fragment of an imaginary longer work enti-
tled Robinson Crusoe in Houyhnhnm Land, a work which opens 
with Crusoe swimming ashore from yet another wreck and 
finding himself in the land which Swift describes in Part IV of 
Gulliver’s Travels. . . . It would do you no end of good to make 
a conscious attempt to imitate the manner of either Defoe 
or Swift, depending on your point of view, in the fragment. 
Without trying to force you into a stylistic straightjacket, let 
me remind you that it is not for nothing that the word “real-
ism” is so often associated with Defoe and the word “irony” so 
often with Swift. (Qtd. in Kannemeyer 175) 
Swift, then, is well known to Coetzee in his capacity as a scholar and 
teacher of language, rhetoric, and irony. Coetzee went on to imitate and 
parody Defoe’s manner, but this exercise also points to a stylistic engage-
ment with Swiftian irony that has not yet been explored by critics.
In an interview in Doubling the Point (1992), Coetzee gives a hint as 
to why, despite his admiration for and familiarity with Swift (and his 
recommendation to his students), he has never attempted to use him in 
a directly intertextual way: 
What I like about eighteenth-century English prose is its trans-
parency, particularly the transparency of its syntax, even when 
the syntax is quite complex.  .  .  . I hope [Foe] does not read 
like pastiche. Perhaps Defoe’s prose is bare enough to serve as 
a model without overwhelming its imitator. I doubt that one 
could imitate Swift without falling into pastiche. (“Interview 
[Syntax]” 146)
Literary history tends to bear this judgment out: explicit imitations of 
Swift are almost uniformly a dire lot, and only a handful of reprises 
of “A Modest Proposal,” with its savage satire, enjoy much success.2 
Nevertheless, even in Coetzee’s first novel, Dusklands (1974), it is pos-
sible to hear echoes of Gulliver’s prefatory letter to his cousin Sympson 
in Eugene Dawn’s barely sane account of his dealings with other humans 
(his wife, son, and employer). Here is Gulliver: “I hope you will be ready 
“A  Fa c e  w i tho u t  Pe r sona l i t y”
5
to own publickly, whenever you shall be called to it, that by your great 
and frequent Urgency you prevailed on me to publish a very loose and 
uncorrect Account of my Travels. . . . But I do not remember that I gave 
you Power to consent, that any thing should be omitted, and much less 
that any thing should be inserted” (6). And here is Eugene Dawn on 
the first page of Dusklands: “Coetzee has asked me to revise my essay. 
It sticks in my craw: he wants it blander, otherwise he wants it elimi-
nated. He wants me out of the way too, I can see it. I am steeling myself 
against this powerful, genial, ordinary man, so utterly without vision. 
I fear him and despise his blindness. I deserved better” (1). Beyond the 
coincidence that both Gulliver and Dawn are authors who feel their 
work has been misused and misunderstood, the passages share a tone 
of injured exceptionalism and second-person aggression. Both narrators 
assert their special status, Gulliver because of the time he spent with 
the Houyhnhnms and Dawn because of his artistic nature. Both con-
front rather than seduce readers. However, the authorial attitude toward 
the personae in each passage differs. Swift’s irony, in this case, appears 
more complex than Coetzee’s: Dawn is revealed to be more or less a 
psychopath, and the first part of Dusklands is a study in the anatomy of 
a monster (albeit a monster with a pathetic side), while Gulliver’s anti-
social attitude is for a long time an element of Gulliver’s Travels’ social 
satire and only blossoms as a psychological disturbance toward the end 
of Book IV. 
Irony is, of course, a notoriously slippery form of rhetoric. In “The 
Agentless Sentence,” Coetzee notes:
The agentless sentence, as a form that says much by saying 
little, is wide open to misunderstanding by an audience not at-
tuned to its nuances. Irony is by nature an aristocratic mode: 
it asserts a bond among the elite who can decode its inverted 
operations. Its spirit is foreign to the mode of political debate 
that prevails in modern democracies. Bearing this in mind, we 
cannot find it surprising that the agentless sentence as an ironic 
device is most thoroughly exploited by such conservative neo-
classical writers as Swift and Gibbon. (180)
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Present day authors who write ironic texts, whether or not they use 
the agentless passive, must be aware that their work, similarly, “is wide 
open to misunderstanding by an audience not attuned to its nuances.” 
An author who has a global profile, as Coetzee does, will inevitably be 
encountered by many readers who do not share his or her frames of ref-
erence. This writing environment is a little different than Swift’s. He was 
addressing a smaller and more clearly divided group of people since he 
routinely published work simultaneously in London and Dublin.3 Yet 
there is a similarity between them; Coetzee writes from a dubious, South 
African edge of civilisation, just as Swift writes from the Irish frontier. 
Both write as members of a settler class who are guiltily (if differently) 
aware of the arbitrariness of their tribe’s local supremacy. The Anglo-
Irish and the Afrikaner have ample historical cause to be connoisseurs 
of rhetorical bad faith.
If Coetzee is learning from Swift, however, the lesson is not about the 
comic arts that normally attend satire. Coetzee’s work tends not to match 
the eye for verbal and situational hilarity that leavens the harshness of 
Swift’s vision. Coetzee’s fiction, unlike Swift’s, is relatively uncomic. 
Much of Gulliver’s Travels (especially the first two books) is playfully, 
comically ridiculous, while Coetzee’s ironies tend toward bleakness (cer-
tainly it is hard to imagine any of his works being successfully abridged 
into a children’s classic). His parody is a process of psychological ex-
ploration that traces the mismatch between the discourses on our lips 
or in our heads and the unruly human passions they seek to shape or 
at least contain. Yet Swift and Coetzee share a fascination with tracing 
the mental tricks of bad faith. Gulliver is an ironic device that allows 
Swift to animate foolishness and knavery in a lucid prose that traps 
readers into recognizing their complicity in the madness of the human 
condition; the same can be said of the narrators of A Tale of a Tub, “The 
Argument against Abolishing Christianity,” and “A Modest Proposal”—
all of his great parodic satires. Coetzee often does something similar. 
Consider Elizabeth Curren’s melodramatic but ineffectual behaviour in 
Age of Iron (1990), or Fyodor’s self-tormenting contortions in Master of 
Petersburg4—or indeed the John Coetzee of Summertime (2009), one 
of the most caustically ambivalent “self-portraits” in all of literature. In 
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creating these characters, Coetzee plunges us into a complex mix of self-
ishness, sanity, guilt, and altruism. He does not have to have learned this 
from Swift, but it is a technique and a way of understanding that was 
plausibly refined by his reading of Swift’s work. The two sorts of writing 
certainly illuminate each other, particularly in the relationship between 
Gulliver and Elizabeth Costello.
II. Elizabeth Costello and Gulliver
At the heart of Elizabeth Costello is the title character’s speech con-
demning the killing of animals for meat. Near the end of the novel, she 
discusses Swift’s work—first “A Modest Proposal” and then Gulliver’s 
Travels. Her criticism of Gulliver’s Travels is acerbic in a postcolonial sort 
of way:
What has always puzzled me about Gulliver’s Travels—and this 
is a perspective you might expect from an ex-colonial—is that 
Gulliver always travels alone. Gulliver goes on voyages of ex-
ploration to unknown lands, but does not come ashore with an 
armed party, as happened in reality, and Swift’s book says noth-
ing about what would normally have come after Gulliver’s pio-
neering efforts: follow-up expeditions, expeditions to colonize 
Lilliput or the island of the Houyhnhnms. (Coetzee, Elizabeth 
102–03; emphasis in original) 
Her statement is a mixture of partial truth and outright error. Gulliver 
arrives alone in the various lands he describes, but his statement about 
colonial expansion, which he gives toward the end of Book IV to vindi-
cate his refusal to claim these lands for the British Crown, is as follows:
I had another Reason, which made me less forward to enlarge 
his Majesty’s Dominions by my Discoveries: To say the Truth, 
I had conceived a few Scruples with relation to the distribu-
tive Justice of Princes upon those Occasions. For Instance, A 
Crew of Pyrates are driven by a Storm they know not whith-
er; at length a Boy discovers Land from the Top-mast; they 
go on Shore to rob and plunder; they see an harmless People, 
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are entertained with Kindness, they give the Country a new 
Name, they take formal Possession of it for the King, they set 
up a rotten Plank, or a Stone for a Memorial, they murder 
two or three Dozen of the Natives, bring away a Couple more, 
by Force, for a Sample, return home, and get their Pardon. 
Here commences a new Dominion acquired with a Title by 
Divine Right. Ships are sent with the first Opportunity; the 
Natives driven out or destroyed, their Princes tortured to dis-
cover their Gold; a free Licence given to all Acts of Inhumanity 
and Lust; the Earth reeking with the Blood of its Inhabitants: 
And this execrable Crew of Butchers, employed in so pious an 
Expedition, is a modern Colony, sent to convert and civilize an 
idolatrous and barbarous People. (Swift, GT IV: 12; 258; em-
phasis in original)
Costello has clearly missed this statement, but her next paragraphs make 
it hard to believe that Coetzee is party to the mistake:
The question I ask is: What if Gulliver and an armed expe-
dition were to land, shoot a few Yahoos when they become 
threatening, and then shoot and eat a horse, for food? What 
would that do to Swift’s somewhat too neat, too disembodied, 
somewhat too unhistorical fable? It would certainly give the 
Houyhnhnms a rude shock, making it clear that there is a third 
category besides gods and beasts, namely, man, of whom their 
ex-client Gulliver is one; furthermore, that if the horses stand 
for reason, then man stands for physical force.
Taking over the island and slaughtering its inhabitants is, 
by the way, what Odysseus and his men did on Thrinacia. 
(Coetzee, Elizabeth 294)
Gulliver’s “murder” matches Costello’s “slaughter”; similarly, “natives” 
matches “inhabitants.” The words appear in the same patterns, with the 
differences reflecting only subtly different preoccupations. The majesty 
of Gulliver’s sardonic summary of colonialism tracks the bad faith of the 
enterprise remorselessly and Costello’s response reads much more like an 
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echo than the critique she seems to think it is. Coetzee might be uncon-
sciously channelling a passage he read long ago and forgot, but it seems 
more likely that, just as Swift marks various sorts of difference between 
his narrators (especially Gulliver) and himself, Coetzee is playing with 
readers gullible enough to straightforwardly equate Costello’s opinions 
with his. The Afrikaner in Coetzee is a match for the Anglo-Irishman 
in Swift; both writers are profoundly unsettled and unsettling in their 
awareness of their conflicting loyalties. Though Costello is a somewhat 
more stable moralist than that ethical chameleon, Gulliver, it appears 
that one narrator’s Englishness and the other’s Australianness mean that, 
in comparison to their highly ambivalent authors, they think they can 
afford some degree of political nonchalance.
Like Swift, Coetzee is uneasy in the national and political identity that 
fate has chosen for him, and that uneasiness has stylistic consequences. 
Edward Said’s description in “Swift as Intellectual” is also apposite for 
Coetzee. Said writes that “Swift is invariably attacking what he imper-
sonates. In other words, his technique is to become the thing he attacks, 
which is normally not a message or a political doctrine but a style or 
manner of discourse. . . . Swift is always aware—and troubles his reader 
with the awareness—that what he is doing above all is writing in a world 
of power” (87; emphasis in original). Like Swift, Coetzee infiltrates the 
style or manner of his targets so that the mutual likeness is in the mode 
of rhetorical attack and possibly subject matter rather than in specific 
verbal echoes or distortions. A reader can see the parodied remains of 
Robinson Crusoe and its enthusiastic vision of colonialism lying around 
in disjointed and disembowelled pieces throughout Foe, but the imi-
tated renditions of power and violence derived from Swift are more fully 
subsumed into Coetzee’s intellectual and artistic approach in Elizabeth 
Costello. Because the tides of power and ideology both deform and form 
identities, Costello, like Gulliver, has only sporadic control of her nar-
rative. We are to be troubled by this, and teased rather than consoled by 
possible solutions. In particular, the text does not consistently encourage 
us to suspend our disbelief and identify with narrators or protagonists 
according to the rules of novelistic realism that were nascent in Swift’s 
time and (arguably) senescent in Coetzee’s. It follows that neither book 
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is really (or at least comfortably) a novel. As David Lodge observes in 
an early review of Elizabeth Costello, “[t]his novel (as one must call it for 
want of a better word) remains ambiguous, partly because of the way 
it mixes and transgresses generic conventions.” The same can be said of 
Gulliver’s Travels. Indeed, the unsettled relationship between Gulliver 
and satirical authority, or between what Gulliver says and what Swift 
seems to mean, is the core reason the text remains difficult to assimi-
late into the realist novel tradition. Sometimes Gulliver speaks with a 
gravitas and cogency that seem to mark no meaningful distance from 
Swift, as in his grand and sardonic attack on colonialism cited above. 
On other occasions, however, Gulliver is clearly a fool. In Book II, for 
example, he sounds more like a public relations hack for the British gov-
ernment, spinning the members of the House of Commons as “[g]en-
tlemen, freely picked and culled out by the People themselves, for their 
great Abilities and Love of their Country, to represent the Wisdom of 
the whole Nation,” only to be brought up short by a counter-authority 
indistinguishable from Swift (Swift, GT II: 6; 128 emphasis in origi-
nal). The King of Brobdingnag witheringly responds: “You have clearly 
proved that Ignorance, Idleness, and Vice are the proper Ingredients for 
qualifying a Legislator” (GT II: 6; 132). By the end of Book IV, Gulliver 
is confined to his stables and the company of horses because he cannot 
bear the stench of humanity, including his long-suffering and sympa-
thetic family. It is a long-established truism of Swift scholarship that 
his narrators are pathologically unreliable5 and that satirical authority 
(where it can be discerned) tends to lie in characters like the King of 
Brobdingnag (Book II), Lord Munodi (Book III), and, more contest-
ably, the Master Houyhnhnm (Book IV). Coetzee comes after the great 
nineteenth-century realists and their modernist successors and so he in-
evitably writes more from within the novel’s conventions of narratorial 
self-disclosure. Once this literary historical placement is accounted for, 
however, Costello’s tenuous and at least sporadic contact with a cen-
tring voice of truth seems decidedly Gulliverian. Swift liked horses and 
Coetzee has crusaded for the rights of animals, but their narrators’ anti-
human enthusiasms take them to a level of crankiness that occasionally 
suggests distance from the authors. Costello’s emotional blankness in 
“A  Fa c e  w i tho u t  Pe r sona l i t y”
11
the text’s chapters or “Lessons” about animal rights frustrates the sort of 
attachment to her that often occurs between readers and the protagonist 
in realist novels or even other Coetzee works such as Age of Iron, Master 
of Petersburg, and Disgrace (1999). Although Costello appears, at other 
points in Elizabeth Costello, affected in a more ordinary way by her life 
experiences and the suffering of other humans, her detachment in the 
animal rights Lessons links her with the Gulliver she (perhaps sanctimo-
niously) repudiates. Her animal rights speech, though partly novelised, 
retains a thesis-like quality not unlike the more open rhetorical opining 
in Gulliver’s Travels.
III. The Misidentification of Elizabeth Costello as a Mouthpiece 
for Coetzee
Although both parts of Dusklands are narrated in the first person 
(Eugene Dawn in the first part and Jacobus Coetzee in the second), no 
reader could reasonably conflate these characters with Coetzee. Elizabeth 
Costello is told in third-person narration and less than two-thirds of the 
text is focalised through the title character, so it is something of a puzzle 
that critics are much more interested in identifying Costello with her 
creator. The temptation to see her opinions as Coetzee’s derives from 
the fact that some of the public speeches put in her mouth started life 
as lectures delivered by Coetzee in propria persona. We contend that this 
critical move does not take the problem of voice in fiction (especially 
in Coetzee’s fiction) seriously enough. A successful novel of ideas does 
not simply become philosophy by other means. To put propositional 
content into a novel reopens the questions of sincerity and situatedness 
of voice that philosophy tends to occlude.
Peter L. Shillingsburg, in an otherwise subtle examination of the evo-
lution of the lecture “The Humanities in Africa,” published in Munich 
in 2001, into Lesson 5 of Elizabeth Costello, argues that in the later 
publication “Elizabeth becomes more clearly Coetzee’s spokesperson 
on behalf of compassion, beauty, sexuality, creativity and personal re-
sponsibility as the chief counters offered by the Humanities against 
the agony, suffering, ugliness and self-denial and rigid elements of the 
Catholic Church” (19). Shillingsburg tempers his conclusion elsewhere 
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in the essay (“Elizabeth Costello, who probably speaks for Coetzee, 
though that remains open to question” [16]), but such attempts to 
read the mind of the author through the words of his characters seem 
misplaced. Carrol Clarkson, writing about Diary of a Bad Year (2007), 
states:
There is no author-narrator who prescribes a resolution to the 
collision of voices from a position of anonymous omniscience. 
Instead, the novel pitches a battle[,] . . . and if the outcome of 
the battle is to be decided, it will be in the “shaky moral imagi-
nation of the reader” (Wood, “In a Cold Country” 7) rather 
than in any ethical prescriptions on the part of the author. (7)
This is equally true of the several voices that are dramatised in Elizabeth 
Costello. Ethics novelised are not the same as ethics syllogised, unless you 
are reading a very mechanical novel of ideas. The critical anxiety over 
identifying the authorial position can also work in the other direction: 
Laura Wright notes a propensity among critics to “overdetermine the 
distance between Coetzee and Elizabeth Costello” (197) because of the 
sentimental nature of Costello’s opinions. She writes that 
[t]he third-person narrated Disgrace .  .  . poses an interesting 
counterpoint because although both Coetzee and protagonist 
David Lurie are male and both teach university-level literature, 
critics do not concern themselves with setting up a distinc-
tion between these two; we seem to more readily accept that 
Coetzee and Lurie are distinct personas, and the “laws” that 
govern readings of fiction forbid us from doing something as 
reductive as conflating the position of author and protagonist. 
But it seems more probable that such an option is never con-
sidered because Coetzee does not perform Lurie in the way that 
he performs Costello. (199)
Costello’s reappearance in Slow Man (2005) as an author trying in vain 
to animate her protagonist might reinforce the critical tendency to 
assume that Coetzee intends her as his stand-in, but it also discourages 
any propensity to conflate the two because she is never a focal character 
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and Paul Rayment, the sole focaliser, views her in a distinctly unfavour-
able light. 
In any case, whether or not, or how, Costello’s opinions align with 
Coetzee’s is beside the point. The novel of ideas is designed to explore 
ideas, not promote them. The (disembodied) narrator of Elizabeth 
Costello remarks that
[r]ealism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could not 
be otherwise: realism is premised on the idea that ideas have 
no autonomous existence, can exist only in things. So when 
it needs to debate ideas . . . realism is driven to invent situa-
tions .  .  . in which characters give voice to contending ideas 
and thereby in a certain sense embody them. The notion of 
embodying turns out to be pivotal. In such debates ideas do not 
and indeed cannot float free: they are tied to the speakers by 
whom they are enounced, and generated from the matrix of in-
dividual interests out of which their speakers act in the world. 
(Coetzee 9; emphasis in original)
This embodiment, however, is also somewhat liberating. Like Swift in 
Gulliver’s Travels, “A Modest Proposal,” and, indeed, all of his prose par-
odies in which the narrator is entranced by his own eloquence, Coetzee 
seems to invite readers to consider the ideas seriously as propositional 
and ethical content (though not as indisputable truths) despite the obvi-
ous flaws in the narrator. Embodying ideas in fiction, as Coetzee notes 
in an interview with David Attwell, makes the expression of passion 
possible within acceptable bounds:
When a real passion of feeling is let loose in discursive prose, 
you feel that you are reading the utterances of a madman. . . . 
The novel, on the other hand, allows the writer to stage his 
passion: Magda, in In the Heart of the Country, may be mad[,] 
.  .  . but I, behind her, am merely passionate.  .  .  . But in the 
medium of prose commentary I can’t be passionate without 
being mad. (“Interview [The Poetics of Reciprocity]” 60–61; 
emphasis in original)
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Costello, especially in The Lives of Animals (1999) and Elizabeth Costello, 
allows Coetzee to be as passionate as he wishes because she, as a fictional 
character, has a licence to seem—or be—somewhat mad. This is very 
Swiftian. Moreover, the staging of these debates, with various points 
of view embodied in various characters, works against the transmission 
of a clear “message,” however hard readers work to extract it. Irony is 
integral to the texts’ argumentation rather than a layer of disguise to be 
seen through.
Elizabeth Costello contains many signs that undermine propositional 
clarity. Firstly, Costello cannot decide what she believes. In Lesson 6, 
“The Problem of Evil,” she is deeply troubled by Paul West’s depiction of 
the execution of Hitler’s would-be assassins. She says “that she no longer 
believes that storytelling is good in itself.  .  .  . If she, as she is nowa-
days, had to choose between telling a story and doing good, she would 
rather, she thinks, do good” (Coetzee, Elizabeth 167). In Lesson 8, “At 
the Gate,” however, she tells her judges that she is “open to all voices, 
not just the voices of the murdered and violated. . . . If it is their mur-
derers and violators who choose to summon [her] instead, to use [her] 
and speak through [her], [she] will not close [her] ears to them” (204). 
Hedges and equivocations surround each statement. Additionally, for 
the purposes of her trial, she eventually remembers, or manufactures, a 
belief in frogs that live in a Victorian river, the Dulgannon, which does 
not actually exist. We can read all of this as Coetzee’s anguished personal 
reflections on the limits of fictional truth, but it is also possible to read 
it as the work of an author distancing himself from a cipher-like nar-
rator. Those who conflate Costello with Coetzee miss the second, more 
Swiftian tone of voice.
Each of the Lessons in Elizabeth Costello ends inconclusively, clouded 
by the narrator’s faintly ludicrous bewilderment that challenges the 
clarities of didacticism. There is an ambiguity in the word Lesson that 
does ironic work for Coetzee; it denotes, among other things, both a 
musical exercise focused on form and the more content-driven and au-
thoritative “lesson” of the Church of England’s liturgy. As with Swift, 
the didacticism does its work from under the cover of plausible deni-
ability. Neither writer lets his readers rest long on the high plains of 
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sanctimonious moralism; all of their moralists, and especially their nar-
rators, have feet of clay.
In her discussion of “A Modest Proposal,” Costello questions its “re-
ceived” interpretation and suggests that Swift might be inviting his read-
ers to draw an analogy between cannibalism and meat eating. When 
Costello tries to be didactic, Stephen Mulhall contends, she is a less 
effective rhetorician than Swift:
By stressing the possibility of reading Swift otherwise, she in-
vites her audience to see a parallel between his modest proposal 
and her outrageous analogy between the Holocaust and factory 
farming. What she does not stress is the disanalogy between 
their approaches. For whereas her alternative reading of Swift 
depends upon attributing to him the desire that his readers ex-
ercise their imaginations, working out his intended moral for 
themselves rather than having it served up for them on a plate, 
Costello explicitly draws the moral she has in mind. . . . One 
might say: her literal-mindedness is of a rather different, and 
potentially less effective, cast than that of Swift. (118)
Costello’s literal-mindedness is no match for Swift’s irony, but the com-
parison should be drawn with the Modest Proposer rather than Swift. 
Coetzee positions his narrator to reason outrageously on a problem that 
remains extremely difficult, even when (or especially when) confidence 
in the narrator is undermined. As fiction understands better than ana-
lytic philosophy, there are no ideal human subjects to make ideal ethical 
decisions, but decisions must be made nevertheless. To put it mildly, 
the Proposer is unreliable, and this pair of sentences is gloriously and 
terribly unhinged:
Some Persons of a desponding Spirit are in great Concern about 
that vast Number of poor People, who are Aged, Diseased, or 
Maimed; and I have been desired to employ my Thoughts what 
Course may be taken, to ease the Nation of so grievous an 
Incumbrance. But I am not in the least Pain upon that Matter; 
because it is very well known, that they are every Day dying, 
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and rotting, by cold, and famine, and filth, and vermin, as fast as 
can be reasonably expected. (Swift, “A Modest Proposal” 114; 
emphasis in original)
What could possibly constitute a reasonable expectation in such cir-
cumstances? The critical point remains, however, that the inhumanity 
occurs whether or not what the Proposer suggests is a sane way of deal-
ing with it. Similarly, while external evidence shows Coetzee’s sympathy 
with many of Costello’s views—his own vegetarianism is a matter of 
public record6—Costello, and the other personae that voice opinions 
discursively in Coetzee’s fictions such as JC in Diary of a Bad Year, are 
not intended to provide a direct exposition of his opinions. Fiction is 
rarely the best option for an expository enterprise, but it can be very 
good at provoking thought. 
IV. Ireland and England; South Africa and Australia
While it is not central to our argument in this essay, the contrast we note 
above between Swift and Coetzee, as members of a colonising minority, 
and the personae they choose in these two fictions, would reward further 
investigation. Coetzee has never denied his complicity, however involun-
tary, in the “audacious and well-planned crime against Africa” commit-
ted by his forebears and white compatriots (“Interview [South African 
Writers]” 342). Without for a moment wanting to deny that Coetzee is 
aware of similar crimes perpetrated by white Australians, one could con-
tend that a reasonably prosperous inhabitant of one of Australia’s coastal 
cities like Costello is more plausibly able to move through life without 
being dogged by such guilty associations. Coetzee moved to Australia 
while writing Elizabeth Costello. In an interview given in 2001, while 
still in the planning stages of the move, he observes:
I have always been impressed by Australian egalitarianism, by 
the way in which Australians relate to each other, spontane-
ously as far as I can see, as equals. You might say that anyone 
from South Africa, with its huge social and racial divisions, 
would have that reaction. But egalitarianism in Australia is, in 
my experience, quite unique in the world. Obviously, it is a 
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consequence of a particular social history. Nevertheless, I find 
it profoundly admirable. (Coetzee and Susskind, “Bulletin”)
His view is uncharacteristically sunny, and the fact that it has subse-
quently been complicated by a decade’s residence in the country is 
demonstrated, for example, in the “Opinion” titled “On Apology” in 
Diary of a Bad Year, which ends, tellingly, with the statement “Jonathan 
Swift, thou shouldst be living at this hour” (9). Indeed, Costello has 
to be reminded of the fate of the Tasmanian Indigenous people by 
the Kafkaesque tribunal in Lesson 8, although she then professes her-
self willing to act as their “secretary” if called upon to do so (Coetzee, 
Elizabeth 203–04). Coetzee would surely be unlikely to describe the 
peoples of southern Africa as an “invisible” people (203), the term that 
Costello uses for the Tasmanian Aborigines. In his 2003 interview with 
Attwell, he compares the successes of the colonial enterprise in various 
parts of the world: 
Seen from the outside as an historical specimen, I am a late rep-
resentative of the vast movement of European expansion that 
took place from the sixteenth century to the mid twentieth 
century of the Christian era, a movement that more or less 
achieved its purpose of conquest and settlement in the Americas 
and Australasia, but failed totally in Asia and almost totally in 
Africa. (Coetzee and Attwell, “An Exclusive Interview”)
The success he refers to in Australia by no means implies approval but 
does signal a belief that those who, like Costello, have been brought up 
in Australia have developed a different set of attitudes than white South 
Africans like him.
Costello and Gulliver have, by dint of national circumstance, a more 
dispassionate attitude toward the colonial enterprise than their respec-
tive authors, and less anxiety of a specifically national variety. White 
Australians like Costello can blithely adopt the role of colonials or 
rugged egalitarians speaking for the oppressed peoples of the world. 
Gulliver, who is presented by Swift as coming from Nottinghamshire 
in the heart of England, wields a rhetoric of good British justice about 
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which Swift has deep reservations. Both, in other words, can be sancti-
monious in ways that are ironically detached from their authors’ more 
consciously conflicted cultural identities. Even in the South African 
novels, as Clarkson points out, 
Coetzee himself does not offer programmatic ethical impera-
tives in the way that his characters often do. . . . [E]ven though 
Mrs Curren’s position may be historically untenable [in Age of 
Iron], Coetzee’s staging of it in a “contest” does not amount to 
its dismissal; the actual outcome of the contest is, in fact, ir-
relevant. What matters is that a countervoice is heard. (160)
Indeed, in Doubling the Point, Coetzee writes that “there is a true sense 
in which writing is dialogic: a matter of awakening the countervoices in 
oneself and embarking upon speech with them. It is some measure of a 
writer’s seriousness whether he does evoke/invoke those countervoices 
in himself ” (“Interview [The Poetics of Reciprocity]” 65). After all, if 
voicing opinions is his aim, Coetzee could readily find a publisher for a 
book of essays conveying the strong opinions that are so ambivalently 
staged in Diary. While not wishing to be reductive, we suggest that at 
least one of the roles these fictional characters play is to voice passions 
that Coetzee acknowledges without wishing to defend them as truths. 
A good novel of ideas is not merely a displaced polemic or work of 
philosophy.
V. Conclusion
The history of the novel can sometimes look like little more than variations 
on themes set by Cervantes. Subsequent authors have “written back” to 
canonical writers such as Shakespeare, Dickens, Milton, the Brontës, 
Defoe, and Wordsworth. By contrast, there are very few successful 
imitations or reworkings of Swift’s work. In Gulliver and his travels, 
Swift invented one of the abiding dystopian myths of modernity, but he 
has perhaps been too intimidating a master of irony and ridicule to be 
taken on directly by successors. We contend that Coetzee, particularly 
in Elizabeth Costello, is deeply if indirectly engaged by Swift’s anatomy 
of bad faith and alerts his readers to this in Costello’s malapert critique 
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of Gulliverian imperialism. Swift cannot be so easily written off as an 
imperialist man, and it is probable that Coetzee wants readers to see that 
in the serious games he plays with his narrator. Both authors deal with 
ideas in fiction in provocative ways that separate us as readers from the 
consolation of a narrative voice that can act as “guide, philosopher, and 
friend” (Pope 279).7
In the opening Lesson of Elizabeth Costello, Costello’s son John de-
scribes her in an almost disturbingly detached way: “Already on her face 
the passive look that, if you saw it in a young girl, you would call with-
drawn. A face without personality, the kind that photographers have to 
work on to lend distinction. Like Keats, he thinks, the great advocate of 
blank receptiveneness” (4). Gulliver, too, is a cipher, “a face without per-
sonality” whose lack of emotional or ethical coherence frustrates readers 
who desire the sentimental recognitions of either sympathy or moral-
ism. This does not mean that Swift and Coetzee cannot enrage readers 
with their uncomfortable exposures of human misconduct. They are far 
from ethically agnostic. What it does mean, however, is that neither 
Swift nor Coetzee will provide the consolations of identification.
Notes
 1 For example, “Person about” searches on the MLA Bibliography database in 
January 2013 yield the following results: 17 for J. M. Coetzee and Kafka (many 
in European languages); 15 for J. M. Coetzee and Dostoevsky; 49 for J. M. 
Coetzee and Defoe; 24 for J. M. Coetzee and Beckett. 
 2 See, for example, Greer’s “A Modest Proposal.” 
 3 The significance of the differences between English and Irish publication is 
enjoying a renaissance among Swift scholars in works like Karian’s Jonathan Swift 
in Print and Manuscript, Griffin’s Swift and Pope: Satirists in Dialogue, and the 
new multi-volume Cambridge edition of Swift’s works. 
 4 See pages 160–63 of Dooley’s J. M. Coetzee and the Power of Narrative for a 
discussion of the two characters’ betrayal of parental love while engaged in futile 
though apparently heroic struggles.
 5 See, for example, Rawson’s Gulliver and the Gentle Reader, Phiddian’s Swift’s 
Parody, and Boyle’s Swift as Nemesis.
 6 For example, in a 2004 interview, Coetzee said that he gave up meat thirty years 
earlier: “God knows why it took me so long. I suppose I thought it was normal 
human behaviour” (Coetzee and Susskind, “Hear Him Roar”).
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 7 Pope used this line as an extravagant and sincere compliment to his and Swift’s 
mutual friend, Lord Bolingbroke. In a small way, this illustrates why Swift and 
Pope shared one of the most gloriously antagonistic and competitive of literary 
friendships.
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